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Citizens, Suspects, and Enemies: 







Concern about the increasing militarization of police has grown in recent years. Much of this 
concern focuses on the material aspects of militarization: the greater use of military 
equipment and tactics by police officers. While this development deserves attention, a subtler 
form of militarization operates on the cultural level. Here, police adopt an adversarial stance 
toward minority communities, whose members are regarded as presumptive objects of 
suspicion. The combination of material and cultural militarization in turn has a potential 
symbolic dimension. It can communicate that members of minority communities are threats 
to society, just as military enemies are threats to the United States. This conception of racial 
and ethnic minorities treats them as outside the social contract rather than as fellow citizens. 
It also conceives of the role of police and the military as comparable, thus blurring in a 






Demonstrations in recent years following the deaths of African Americans, 
especially African American men, at the hands of police have raised fundamental issues 
about race and criminal justice in the United States. Central to these demonstrations is 
concern about the use of force by the state against its own citizens.1 One prominent way in 
which this is expressed is the claim that there is a trend toward the “militarization” of the 
police in America, in particular, the use of military tactics and equipment by police and the 
acquisition of such equipment through programs such as the one administered by the 
Department of Defense. This concern reflects unease about what I call the “material” 
dimension of militarization. The risk posed by this dimension is physical: that police will 
use intense violence against individuals and communities to secure order. Police officers 
should not act like soldiers because soldiers are authorized to use especially destructive 
means to secure their objectives, means that the police should not be permitted to use.  
 
Apprehension about the police becoming more militarized is reflected even more 
directly in the objection to the use of military forces to respond to public demonstrations, 
as President Donald Trump has suggested is necessary to quell some of the recent protests 
 
1 By "citizens," I mean to include all persons in the United States who may be subject to the use of force, 
regardless of their legal status. I use the term both for shorthand convenience and to highlight the issues in 
political theory that I will be discussing. 
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against police violence.2 Criticism of this suggestion has been widespread, including from 
prominent former military leaders.3 As former Secretary of Defense Gen. (Ret.) James 
Mattis declared, referring to language used by then-Secretary of Defense Mark Esper, “We 
must reject any thinking of our cities as a ‘battlespace’ that our uniformed military is called 
upon to ‘dominate.’”4 Criticism of police militarization and of using the military to secure 
public order thus reflects the same underlying concern. 
 
Conceiving of the difference between the police and the military in terms of the level 
of violence each can inflict calls attention to an important risk that militarized police can 
pose. There is a subtler dimension of militarization, however, which I call its “cultural” 
dimension. This involves how police officers approach the communities in which they work 
as well as public perceptions of the proper relationship between the police and these 
communities. As I suggest in this article, cultural militarization reflects an orientation in 
which police regard their relationship with certain communities as adversarial, and 
members of those communities as criminal suspects. In its extreme form, police work 
becomes akin to deployment in warfare, wherein citizens become enemies rather than 
fellow members of the community. This form of militarization is not reflected simply in 
weapons and tactics, but in attitudes and habits of mind. 
 
Appreciating this dimension of militarization underscores that police should not act 
like soldiers because police are meant to protect citizens against criminals, while soldiers 
protect citizens against enemies. Criminals are deviants within the community. Enemies 
are outside the social contract and thus are not entitled to the kind of concern that fellow 
citizens deserve. Police treatment of certain groups of citizens as enemies threatens to 
erase this distinction and to blur the roles of the police and the military. It also has a 
symbolic political dimension in that it communicates to the larger public that certain 
citizens are outside the social contract and thus are not deserving of the benefits of full 
citizenship. Such a message threatens the very foundations of a liberal democracy. This is 
the fundamental danger of police militarization. As this paper will describe, there is reason 




This article draws on empirical research on policing in America in recent years to 
describe the ways in which police operations in some minority communities blur the line 
between the police and the military. The work in this field includes research on both the 
material and cultural dimensions of militarization. These studies help clarify that concern 
 
2 The president has declared that, “if a city or state refuses to take the actions necessary to defend the life and 
property of their residents, then I will deploy the United States military and quickly solve the problem for 
them.” Steve Herman, “Trump Threatens Wide Use of Military Force Against Protesters,” Voice of America, 
June 2, 2020, https://www.voanews.com/usa/trump-threatens-wide-use-military-force-against-protesters.  
3 Zeke Miller and Robert Burns, “Pentagon-Trump Clash Breaks Open Over Military and Protests,” ABC News, 
June 4, 2020, https://apnews.com/article/3a49cd9ff99b98b4cd9e55c9364e6574. 




about police militarization reflects not simply anxiety about the physical effects of 
militarization, but a deeper concern about distinguishing between different state agents 
who are authorized to use force in different ways to provide security for citizens in a liberal 
democracy.  
 
Policing scholar Peter Kraska defines police militarization as “the process whereby 
civilian police increasingly draw from, and pattern themselves around, the tenets of 
militarism and the military model.”5 He describes militarism as “a set of beliefs, values, and 
assumptions that stress the use of force and threat of violence as the most appropriate and 
efficacious means to solve problems.”6 Kraska suggests that there are four dimensions of 
militarization: (1) material, reflected in greater use of military equipment; (2) cultural, 
involving the adoption of military beliefs and values; (3) organizational, as evidenced, for 
example, by the use of paramilitary units modeled on military special operations forces; 
and (4) operational, reflected in aggressive preventive patrolling.7 He acknowledges that 
there has always been some military influence on policing, since, like the military, police 
are authorized to use force if necessary to achieve their objectives.8 Since militarization is, 
therefore, a matter of degree, the relevant question is “where the civilian police fall on the 
continuum and in what direction they are headed.”9 
 
With about 18,000 law enforcement agencies in the United States, it can be 
misleading to make sweeping statements about the “police.”10 Individual agencies are likely 
to differ in various ways, including the extent to which they are militarized. Nonetheless, 
trends in the law enforcement community appear to indicate that many agencies are 
moving in a common direction. My goal in this article is to examine whether this is 
occurring, whether it is contributing to more effective law enforcement, and what its 
broader impacts might be. Only by engaging with empirical research can we fully 
understand police militarization.  
 
 
5 Peter B. Kraska, “Militarization and Policing – Its Relevance to 21st Century Police,” Policing 
1, no. 4 (2007): 503, https://doi.org/10.1093/police/pam065. 
6 Kraska, “Militarization and Policing,” 503. Kraska has written extensively on police militarization since the 
1990s. Peter B. Kraska and Shannon Williams, “The Material Reality of State Violence: The Case of Police 
Militarization,” in The Routledge International Handbook of Violence Studies, ed. Walter S. DeKeseredy, Callie 
Marie Rennison, and Amanda K. Hall-Sanchez (New York: Routledge, 2019). 
7 Kraska, “Militarization and Policing,” 503. 
8 In addition, William Allison has noted that reformers around the turn of the 20th century drew on the 
military metaphor in their campaign to eliminate corruption and professionalize local police forces. See, 
William Thomas Allison, “The Militarization of American Policing: Enduring Metaphor for a Shifting Context,” 
in Uniform Behavior: Police Localism and National Politics, ed. Stacy McGoldrick and Andrea McArdle (New 
York: Palgrave McMillan, 2006), 9. 
9 Kraska, “Militarization and Policing,” 504. 
10 National Sources of Law Enforcement Employment Data, U.S. Department of Justice, April 2016, revised Oct. 




 We can gain insight into police militarization by slightly reframing Kraska’s typology 
to focus on just the cultural and material dimensions, and to add a third dimension: the 
symbolic. The symbolic dimension focuses on the message that cultural and material 
militarization send about the relationship between the state and its citizens in a liberal 
democracy. 
 
The first section of this article discusses how an increasing use of military 
metaphors, an uptick in what I call aggressive preventive policing, and reliance on more 
heavily armed patrol officers all reflect a subtle cultural shift toward a more adversarial 
relationship between many police departments and the communities they serve, especially 
in minority communities. The second section examines the material dimension of 
militarization, which involves expanded use of police paramilitary units and military 
equipment. These two dimensions can mutually reinforce one another: The cultural 
dimension can make the use of military tactics and weapons seem more appropriate and 
normal, while the availability of military equipment may subtly incline those who have 
access to them to use them. Section three explores how the combination of cultural and 
material militarization generates a symbolic dimension. This dimension can signal that 
certain members of the community — especially members of minority communities — are 
outside the social contract and thus are potential enemies. From this perspective, just as 
the military protects citizens from external enemies, the police protect them from internal 
ones. 
 
In the conclusion, I suggest that developments in these three dimensions reflect an 
intensification of police militarization in recent years in many minority communities.11 The 
two primary dimensions of militarization raise distinctive concerns: Cultural militarization 
makes the relationship between police and minority communities more adversarial as 
police who regard themselves as crime fighters aggressively seek out suspects. Material 
militarization increases the intensity of the violence that police have available to them in 
pursuing these suspects.  
 
Appreciation of these complex aspects of police militarization helps clarify the 
respective roles of the police and the military in keeping the citizenry secure and the 
danger in blurring them. It also suggests that it may be time to rethink how America 
attempts to secure domestic public safety. Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has 
criticized what he calls the “overmilitarization” of U.S. foreign policy, which neglects tools 
 
11 For a deeper discussion on race, policing, and criminal justice, see generally, Michelle Alexander, The New 
Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness (New York: The New Press, 2012); Paul Butler, 
Chokehold: Policing Black Men (New York: The New Press, 2018); James Forman, Jr., Locking Up Our Own: 
Crime and Punishment in Black America (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 2017); Frank R. Baumgartner, 
Derek A. Epp, and Kelsey Shoub, Suspect Citizens: What 20 Million Traffic Stops Tell Us About Policing and Race 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018); and Charles R. Epp, Steven Maynard-Moody, and Donald 




such as diplomacy and economic assistance in enhancing external security.12 There is 
reason to believe that there has been an overmilitarization of the task of ensuring internal 
security as well.  
 
More generally, increasing police militarization creates the risk that policing in 
minority communities will be seen not as law enforcement, but as national security 
operations against domestic enemies of the United States. There are aspects of domestic 
policing that do have a national security dimension, but daily interaction between police 
and racial and ethnic minorities should not be regarded as one of these. To treat it as such 
opens the door to more expansive use of force and greater restrictions on liberty than 
should be accepted in ordinary law enforcement. Aside from the concrete consequences for 
minority community members, this conception of police operations threatens to weaken 
the integrity of the very concept of national security, thereby distorting our understanding 
of what count as genuine national security concerns.  
 
THE CULTURAL DIMENSION OF MILITARIZATION 
 
The Police and the Military 
 
In assessing the extent to which police adopt a military perspective, it is helpful to 
clarify the role of these two state agents. Donald Campbell and Kathleen Campbell write 
that the traditional description of the role of police is to “protect and serve” the 
community,13 while Arthur Rizer suggests that the mission of the police is to "keep the 
peace."14 Under these definitions, the police ought to avoid using violence unless it is 
unavoidable.15 By contrast, the military is responsible for protecting the state from external 
enemies. According to Rizer, military personnel “are trained to identify people they 
encounter as belonging to one of two groups — the enemy and the non-enemy — and they 
often reach this decision while surrounded by a population that considers the soldier an 
occupying force.”16 In such situations, military forces must look upon the local population 
 
12 Robert M. Gates, “The Overmilitarization of American Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs 99, no. 4 (July/August 
2020): 121, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-06-02/robert-gates-
overmilitarization-american-foreign-policy. 
13 Donald J. Campbell and Kathleen M. Campbell, “Soldiers as Police Officers/Police Officers as Soldiers: Role 
Evolution and Revolution in the United States,” Armed Forces & Society 36, no. 2 (2010): 327, 
https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0095327X09335945. 
14 Arthur Rizer and Joseph Hartman, “How the War on Terror Has Militarized the Police,” The Atlantic, Nov. 7, 
2011, https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2011/11/how-the-war-on-terror-has-militarized-the-
police/248047/.  
15 This will be reflected in domestic law, as informed by basic human rights principles. For the latter, see, 
“Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials,” United Nations, Office of 
the High Command, 1990, 
https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/useofforceandfirearms.aspx. 
16 Rizer and Hartman, “How the War,” 12. 
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with suspicion, alert to the presence of enemies against whom they are authorized to use 
lethal force as a first resort.17 
 
Campbell and Campbell suggest that the ideal types of police and military forces 
have three different orientations. With regard to their jobs, police “protect and prevent,” 
while the military “overwhelm[s] and pacif[ies].”18 The frequency with which police use 
force is low and is treated as a last resort, while for the military use of force is high in that it 
is frequent and is treated as a first resort. Finally, the police ideally assume that their work 
environment is mostly benign, while the military assumes it is mostly hostile.19  
 
These orientations reflect the fact that the police operate within the community they 
serve, and share a common concern with citizens for its welfare. Police help reinforce 
shared norms of behavior by protecting fellow citizens from other citizens who would 
violate these norms. In this respect, they stand within, not outside, the community and 
work with, not against, it to enable the peaceful co-existence of its members. By contrast, 
the military protects the community from outsiders. Its orientation is outward, not inward, 
as it stands guard against external enemies. In this sense, the military acts on behalf of, but 
not in collaboration with, those whose security it protects. The norms it follows in its 
operations are particular to this role and are distinct from the norms of ordinary life. 
Concern about police militarization, I will suggest, reflects anxiety that police increasingly 
are adopting this orientation toward those they serve, instead of seeing themselves as 
providing security through collaboration with fellow citizens.  
 
Anxiety about a gulf between those who protect society and society itself dates back 
to the founding of the American republic. At that time, it took the form of fear that a 
standing professional army could become a group separate from ordinary citizens, and 
could thereby be used by officials to suppress them. The American colonists’ experience 
with the British Army enforcing the law in the colonies led many colonial leaders to regard 
a standing army as less attuned and committed to shared republican values, and thus as a 
potential threat to government based on those values. They drew on the observations of 
British jurist William Blackstone who wrote, “Nothing … ought to be more guarded against 
in a free state than making the military power … a body too distinct from the people.”20 In 
this vein, John Adams and Thomas Jefferson criticized Oliver Cromwell’s New Model Army, 
a novel professional force that had helped remove King Charles I from the throne and 
install Cromwell as Lord Protector, as “loyal not to an ideal or to a government but to a 
commander and to its own traditions.”21 
 
17 See, “The Geneva Conventions and Their Commentaries,” International Committee of the Red Cross, Jan. 1, 
2014, https://www.icrc.org/en/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/geneva-conventions. 
18 Campbell and Campbell, “Soldiers as Police Officers,” 327–50. 
19 Campbell and Campbell, “Soldiers as Police Officers,” 344. 
20 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, ed. Edward Christian, vol. I, ch. 13, 413 (1800). 
21 Quoted in Richard H. Kohn, Eagle and Sword: The Federalists and the Creation of the Military Establishment 




By contrast, for many American constitutional framers, a civilian militia would be 
comprised of people who would answer the call to defend the nation when necessary but 
would then return to their private affairs after having fulfilled this responsibility.22 This 
was seen as providing reassurance that the citizen-soldier would not use his weapons 
against his fellow citizens. As Alexander Hamilton argued, “What shadow of danger can 
there be from men who are daily mingling with the rest of their countrymen and who 
participate with them in the same feelings, sentiments, habits, and interests?”23 This led 
anti-Federalists to propose that the defense of the country should be the primary 
responsibility of civilian militias in each state, which could be “called forth” periodically 
when the nation was threatened, rather than a permanent army.24  
 
Their proposal did not prevail. Nevertheless, the debate highlights a basic 
underlying concern about those who are authorized to use force to protect the community. 
To be sure, the debate was based on the founders’ experience with the British crown and 
the fear that the army could be used to undermine their democratic experiment and restore 
a monarchy. It was also shaped by concerns about reposing too much authority in a federal 
government at the expense of the states. Each concern, however, reflected a deeper worry 
that those responsible for the security of the community might not see themselves as fellow 
citizens mutually committed to the same norms and values.  
 
Today, the civilian militia takes the form of state National Guard units, which can be 
federalized when the president deems appropriate. In the late-19th and early-20th 
centuries, local police gradually replaced civilian militias in keeping order in large cities, 
while state police emerged to do the same in rural areas.25 Police thus assumed the role of 
the militia in serving as members of the community, responsible for keeping it safe.  
 
The fear that soldiers rather than police would be used for domestic law 
enforcement is reflected in the Posse Comitatus Act. The term is Latin for “power of the 
county,” which refers to the tradition under which a county sheriff could mobilize citizens 
to suppress lawlessness or defend the county — that is, engage in local law enforcement.  
The act states, “Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by 
the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a 
posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws” is subject to fine and imprisonment. In 
 
22 Deborah N. Pearlstein, “The Soldier, the State, and the Separation of Powers,” Texas Law Review, 90, no. 4 
(2012): 797, 846, http://texaslawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Pearlstein-90-TLR-797.pdf.  
23 Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 29 in The Federalist Papers, ed. Clinton Rossiter (New York: Penguin 
Putnam, 1961), 186. 
24 Lawrence Delbert Cress, “Republican Liberty and National Security: American Military Policy as an 
Ideological Problem, 1783 to 1789,” William and Mary Quarterly 38, no. 1 (January 1981): 73–96, 
https://doi.org/10.2307/1916858. 
25 Robert Reinders, "Militia and Public Order in Nineteenth-Century America," Journal of American Studies 11, 
no. 1 (April 1977): 81–101, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021875800003388. 
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recent years, Congress has authorized an increasing military role in aid of law enforcement 
efforts, such as drug interdiction.26 As reflected, however, in widespread criticism of 
Trump’s claim that it is necessary to use the military to restore public order in the wake of 
demonstrations protesting police violence, there remains considerable resistance to using 
the military for direct law enforcement.27 This echoes the founders’ concern that a 
professional military might be deployed against persons whom they regard not as fellow 
citizens but as enemies of the state. As Mattis said in criticizing Trump’s actions, “Keeping 
public order rests with civilian state and local leaders who best understand their 
communities and are answerable to them.”28 
 
A standing professional army has not turned out to pose the risk that the founders 
feared. We need to consider, however, whether this risk may be emerging from local police 
forces that are becoming more militarized. The remainder of this section discusses trends 
that suggest that this may be occurring, at least with respect to police relationships with 
many minority communities.  
 
The Metaphor of War 
 
Reliance on the metaphor of war is a prominent expression of cultural 
militarization. As David Davenport and Gordon Lloyd observe, over the last few decades 
the war metaphor has been “a powerful rhetorical tool that has shaped public policy. There 
are troops to muster, enemies to fight, and battles to win.”29 The claims that police are 
engaged in a “war on drugs” and a “war on terror” explicitly reflect a military orientation 
 
26 Stephen Dycus et al., National Security Law, 6th ed. (New York: Wolters-Kluwer, 2016), 1235–42. 
27 On Trump’s claim, see, Christina Wilkie and Amanda Macis, “Trump Threatens to Deploy Military as George 
Floyd Protests Continue to Shake the U.S.,” CNBC, June 1, 2020, https://www.cnbc.com/2020/06/01/trump-
threatens-to-deploy-military-as-george-floyd-protests-continue-to-shake-the-us.html; and, “Trump 
Threatens Use Of Military On Protesters; George Floyd’s Brother Urges Peace,” Associated Press, June 1, 2020, 
https://www.oregonlive.com/nation/2020/06/trump-declares-himself-president-of-law-and-order-
threatens-use-of-military-on-protesters.html. For criticism, see, Thomas Gibbons-Neff et al., “Former 
Commanders Fault Trump’s Use of Troops Against Protesters,” New York Times, June 2, 2020, updated July 9, 
2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/02/us/politics/military-national-guard-trump-protests.html; and 
Steven Nelson, “Defense Secretary Mark Esper Opposes Trump on Use of Military in Riots,” New York Post, 
June 3, 2020, https://nypost.com/2020/06/03/defense-secretary-opposes-trump-on-use-of-military-in-
riots/. 
28 The Posse Comitatus Act is a reflection of the often close relationship between race and regulation of the 
use of force in much of American history. Its impetus was the resentment of the South to the use of federal 
troops to enforce Reconstruction and protect newly freed blacks from violence. Federal troops were 
withdrawn from the South in 1877 in exchange for Southern support that enabled Rutherford B. Hayes to 
become president as a result of the election of 1876. Southern Democrats then gained passage of the act in 
1878. William C. Banks and Stephen Dycus, Soldiers on the Home Front: The Domestic Role of the American 
Military (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016), 72. For Mattis’ quote, see, “Former Defense 
Secretary Mattis' Statement on Trump and Protests.”  
29 David Davenport and Gordon Lloyd, “The Rise of the War Metaphor in Public Policy,” Hoover Institution, 
May 6, 2019, https://www.hoover.org/research/rise-war-metaphor-public-policy.  
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toward law enforcement.30 President Richard Nixon stated that drug use was “public 
enemy number one” and declared a war on drugs in 1973. President Ronald Reagan 
elevated the prominence of this campaign and devoted substantial resources to waging it. 
Between 1982 and 2007, the number of arrests for drug possession tripled, from 
approximately 500,000 to 1.5 million per year.31 Several scholars have described how this 
campaign resulted in substantial increases in incarceration, especially of African American 
males.32  
 
James Forman Jr. has documented how the support for the war on drugs among 
influential leaders in the African American community gave it substantial momentum.33 
These leaders knew that expanded enforcement of drug laws would affect a 
disproportionate number of persons of color, but they were willing to accept this because 
of their concern that drugs were destroying minority communities. As Forman emphasizes, 
African American leaders believed that increasing drug prosecutions should have been 
accompanied by devoting substantial resources to these communities to strengthen 
education and social services, and to enhance economic opportunities, something that 
unfortunately never occurred. 
 
As warriors in a war on drugs, police must act aggressively in ways that go beyond 
normal police practice. Eliav Lieblich and Adam Shinar observe, “War … is the 
quintessential military concept, packing almost mythical powers as the ultimate state of 
exception.”34 In particular, it authorizes a more expansive use of force and a greater 
restriction of liberty than in peacetime because of the gravity of the threats that the 
government has to combat. Lieblich and Shinar suggest, “In terms of political discourse, the 
war metaphor serve[s] to elevate certain categories of crime to existential national security 
threats, certain types of criminals to enemies, and thus certain types of situations to 
exceptional ones.”35 
 
30 Susan P. Stuart, “War as Metaphor and the Rule of Law in Crisis: The Lessons We Should Have Learned from 
the War on Drugs,” Southern Illinois University Law Journal 36, no. 1 (Fall 2011): 5, 
https://law.siu.edu/academics/law-journal/issues/fall-2011.html. On metaphors for policing and the public 
sentiments they elicit, see, Paul H. Thibodeau, Latoya Crow, and Stephen J. Flusberg, “The Metaphor Police: A 
Case Study of the Role of Metaphor in Explanation,” Psychonomic Bulletin and Review 24 (2017): 1375–86, 
https://doi.org/10.3758/s13423-016-1192-5. 
31 Hannah L.F. Cooper, “War on Drugs Policing, and Police Brutality,” Substance Use and Misuse 50, no. 8–9 
(2015): 1188–1194, https://dx.doi.org/10.3109%2F10826084.2015.1007669. 
32 See, Alexander, New Jim Crow; Forman, Locking Up; and Doris Marie Provine, “Race and Inequality in the 
War on Drugs,” Annual Review of Law and Social Science, no. 7 (December 2011): 41–60, 
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-lawsocsci-102510-105445. See also, Marc Mauer, Race to Incarcerate (New 
York: The New Press, 2006).  
33 Forman, Locking Up, 17–46.  
34 Eliav Lieblich and Adam Shinar, “The Case Against Police Militarization,” Michigan Journal of Race and Law 
23, no. 1–2 (2018): 113, https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjrl/vol23/iss1/4. See also, Stuart, “War as 
Metaphor”; and Erik Luna, “Drug War and Peace,” UC Davis Law Review 50, no. 2 (2016): 813, 
https://lawreview.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/50/2/Topic/50-2_Luna.pdf.  




Police wage war through a variety of operations and tactics designed to take the 
fight to the enemy. These include undercover sting operations, pretextual stops for minor 
legal violations, various surveillance techniques, and surprise raids designed to obtain 
evidence for arrests.36 As Peter Kraska and Victor Kappeler have described, “Rather than 
reactively responding to traditional crimes such as robbery, the police can go into the 
population and proactively produce cases against an almost limitless number of drug users 
and low-level dealers.”37  
 
While these aggressive tactics may seem like the opposite of community policing, 
the two are presented as complementary in programs such as the Department of Justice 
“weed and seed” program, which gave assistance to law enforcement agencies from 1991 
to 2009. As the Justice Department described it, the program was based on “a two-pronged 
approach to crime control and prevention: Law enforcement agencies and prosecutors 
cooperate in ‘weeding out’ criminals from the designated area. ‘Seeding’ brings prevention, 
intervention, treatment, and neighborhood revitalization services to the area.”38 The idea is 
that aggressive police work establishes order in the community, which in turn provides a 
foundation for efforts by residents to build social networks and physical infrastructure.39  
 
 Police leaders have elaborated on the rationale for this approach. One police chief of 
a department that sees itself as engaged in community policing, for instance, describes it 
this way: 
 
The only people that are going to be able to deal with these problems (drugs, 
guns, gangs, and community disorder) are highly trained tactical teams with 
the proper equipment to go into a neighborhood and clear the neighborhood 
and hold it; allowing community policing and problem-oriented policing 
officers to come in and start turning the neighborhood around.40 
 
 Similarly, a Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team commander explains how his 
unit’s operations support community policing: 
 
We conduct a lot of saturation patrol. We do “terry [reasonable suspicion] 
stops” and aggressive field interviews. These tactics are successful as long as 
the pressure stays on relentlessly. The key to our success is that we’re an 
 
36 Mona Lynch, “Theorizing the Role of the ‘War on Drugs’ in US Punishment,” Theoretical Criminology 16, no. 
2 (2012): 175, 177, https://doi.org/10.1177%2F1362480612441700. 
37 Peter B. Kraska and Victor E. Kappeler, “Militarizing American Police: The Rise and Normalization of 
Paramilitary Units,” Social Problems 44, no. 1 (February 1997): 7, https://doi.org/10.2307/3096870. 
38 The Weed and Seed Strategy, U.S. Department of Justice, November 2004, 1, 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/207498.pdf. 
39 Kraska, “Militarization and Policing,” 509–10. 
40 Kraska and Kappeler, “Militarizing American Police,” 13. 
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elite crime fighting team that’s not bogged down in the regular bureaucracy. 
We focus on “quality of life” issues like illegal parking, loud music, bums, 
troubles. We have the freedom to stay in a hot area and clean it up — 
particularly gangs. Our tactical team works nicely with our department’s 
emphasis on community policing.41  
As this quote illustrates, the war metaphor can be extended beyond drugs to include 
enemies who threaten order in a variety of ways. Kraska suggests that police in these 
operations “are integrating a military-model approach — occupy, suppress through force, 
and restore the affected territory.”42 The emphasis is on “taking back the neighborhood, 
creating a climate of order, and aggressively enforcing minor law and order infractions; all 
in an effort to cultivate healthier communities.”43  
 Those who are familiar with military operations will recognize the similarity of this 
approach to the “clear, hold, and build” counter-insurgency strategy employed by the U.S. 
military in Iraq and Afghanistan in the late 2000s. The 2014 U.S. Army counter-insurgency 
manual says that this begins with a preliminary phase in which “the population needs to 
understand that there will be an increase in security and initially local leaders should be 
contacted.”44 Thereafter, “the clear phase is an effort to remove the open insurgent 
presence in an area.”45 Next comes the hold phase, which “is defined by providing security 
for the population in an area [in which] open insurgent presence cannot return.”46 Finally, 
“the build phase entails efforts to increase security and governmental capacity so that 
government and local forces can control the area and prevent the return of insurgents.”47 
Once this occurs, control is transferred to local leaders in a given area. 
Police used this approach in an operation conducted in Pittsburgh in August 2007. 
In response to six shootings in three incidents in the Homewood neighborhood, police 
conducted a sweep of 27 abandoned homes, looking for drugs and guns. The operation 
included a Ballistic Engineered Armored Response vehicle with bulletproof plating, a state 
police helicopter, 20 police cruisers, and a SWAT team.48 The 20-ton armor-plated vehicle 
holds 12–14 police officers in full tactical gear, has four “gun ports” on each side that can 
accommodate sniper rifles, and has a rooftop hatch that opens into a rotating turret. It has 
“extra ramming power” to push aside cars, walls, and doors. No one was arrested during 
the two-day sweep.  
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Four months later, police conducted another eight-hour sweep in four 
neighborhoods, which police called a “saturation patrol.”49 It included a helicopter and 
dozens of officers from city, state, and federal law enforcement agencies. According to the 
police, such patrols do not target specific individuals, but neighborhoods where police 
expect to find criminal activity.50 They begin with an advance team of plainclothes officers 
who set up on corners to identify anyone who may be dealing drugs or carrying weapons.51 
Once they do, uniformed police in bulletproof vests make arrests and conduct searches. All 
the neighborhoods targeted by these two sweeps were predominantly African American.  
Operations such as these involve displays of equipment meant to serve as a 
deterrent to any unlawful behavior, similar to a show of force by the military.52 No actual 
use of force may ensue, but the operation communicates the threat that it could be used. 
The police are presenting that they are engaged in a struggle with an enemy in which it 
may be necessary to use overwhelming force. 
 
Police involvement in what has been called a war on terror also reinforces a military 
orientation. As one publication directed to the law enforcement community argued, “Local 
officers are … [m]ore likely than federal terrorism agents to encounter suspicious activity 
that could be related to terrorism.”53 Police, therefore, can “act as extra eyes and ears for 
the various federal agencies that investigate terrorism cases” if they operate with a 
“heightened cognizance of the terrorist threat.”54 This focus on terrorist threats may 
expand the universe of persons considered objects of suspicion beyond African Americans 
to those of Arab or South Asian descent.55  
 
In addition, since the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks, police have sought to increase their 
ability to deal with terrorism in the United States, adopting military weapons, tactics, and 
training methods and seeking to inculcate what Arthur Rizer calls a “soldier’s mentality.”56 
Substantial Department of Homeland Security funds have been provided to local police 
departments since 2002 for counter-terrorism in order to enable surveillance of potential 
security threats.57 The result is that, “by bringing international counter-terrorism 
techniques to bear on domestic citizens, police departments have abandoned a focus on de-
escalation and crowd control in favor of an approach that treats political dissent as a 
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coordinated threat.”58 As with the war on drugs, the war on terror proclaims a state of 
exception in which police operations need not stringently follow normal procedures.59 
 
Emphasis on the wars on drugs and terror have resulted in greater militarization of 
training in many police forces. Rosa Brooks’ research on American policing leads her to 
conclude that “[t]he majority of law-enforcement academies in the United States are loosely 
modeled on military boot camps.”60 Over the past two decades, the speaker who has 
probably helped train more police departments than anyone else is Dave Grossman, a 
former West Point professor whose books deal with the psychological experience of killing 
and its aftermath.61 One article in 2017 estimated that he had spoken to more than 100 
police departments across the country in the previous two years.62  
 
Grossman refers to his area of expertise as “killology,” and his work provides 
insights into the complex psychological and emotional consequences of taking life. “Our 
goal is never to kill,” he says to police officers. “Our goal is to save lives.”63 At the same time, 
Grossman emphasizes to them, “We are at war. And our cops are the front-line troops in 
that war. You are the Delta force. You are the Green Berets. It’s your job to put a piece of 
steel in your fist and kill those sons of bitches when they come to kill our kids.”64 He tells 
police that the level of urban violence today is unprecedented. He also tells them that “the 
number of cops murdered in the line of duty has skyrocketed. The systematic murder, 
ambush, and execution of cops has become the norm.”65 His goal is to make police officers 
more comfortable with the prospect of killing and to handle its psychological 
consequences. This message explicitly equates the police with the military and emphasizes 
the need for them to receive training comparable to that provided to military forces.  As 
one person who took his class comments, “Combat has clear military connotations, and 
Grossman’s frequent use of the term undergirds the course’s martial framing.”66 
 
In addition to an emphasis on the potential need to use lethal force, militarized 
police training sends subtler messages. As Brooks puts it, 
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When police recruits are belittled by their instructors and ordered to refrain 
from responses other than “Yes, Sir!,” they may learn stoicism — but they 
may also learn that mocking and bellowing orders at those with less power 
are acceptable actions. When recruits are ordered to do push-ups to the point 
of exhaustion because their boots weren’t properly polished, they may learn 
the value of attention to detail — but they may also conclude that the 
infliction of pain is an appropriate response to even the most trivial 
infractions.67 
 
 Using a warfare metaphor in policing — whether in the war on drugs or the war on 
terror — is a crucial element of cultural militarization, one that can have a significant effect 
on how police officers regard their work and those whom they encounter while on duty. 
The next section describes how a variety of policing practices that do not involve the use of 
lethal force can nonetheless reflect a military orientation. 
 
Aggressive Preventive Policing 
 
Some of the operations I have described rely explicitly on the metaphor of war. But 
they also reflect a general movement over the last 25 years toward what I call “aggressive 
preventive policing.” Tom Tyler, Jonathan Jackson, and Avital Mentovich describe this shift 
in policing practices: “The police have moved from a focus on acting against crime that is in 
the process of occurring or on solving already committed crimes to a proactive strategy of 
preventive measures aimed at deterring future crimes.”68 In many cases, these involve 
stops of individuals based on suspicion, rather than evidence, that they are engaged in 
illegal conduct. 
Preventive policing in itself is not necessarily an indication of militarization. 
Research has identified various ways to attempt to prevent crime by combining 
professional expertise with community involvement. In particular, approaches that foster 
the perceived legitimacy of the police can increase community members’ willingness to 
abide by the law, to report crimes, and to cooperate with the police in investigations.69 
These can lead to long-term reductions in crime without the costs associated with 
aggressive preventive policing that I describe below.  
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This section discusses the origins of this form of preventive policing and its 
rationale. It then examines evidence indicating that enforcing marijuana laws, the New 
York stop-and-frisk program that has been ruled unlawful, and routine traffic stops all 
reflect implicit treatment of racial and ethnic minorities, especially African American men, 
as potential threats. Next, it discusses how this orientation is reinforced by police officer 
perceptions of being in danger, and concludes with a review of the research on the effects 
of aggressive preventive policing on criminal activity. 
 
 
The History of Aggressive Preventive Policing 
 
Police work has always been preventive to some extent. Police patrols on foot or in 
police cars are traditional efforts to prevent crime rather than simply reacting to it. In 
contrast, aggressive preventive policing involves three things: The first is the practice of 
increasing the number of stops and arrests for minor crimes in the belief that this will take 
people who are likely to commit more serious crimes off the streets. The second is an 
expansive interpretation of what constitutes “reasonable suspicion” of criminal activity as a 
basis for stopping, questioning, and frisking individuals. The third is prominent displays of 
force, including using military equipment, in certain communities with the aim of deterring 
crime. 
 
One result has been more frequent police initiation of contact with individuals.70 
Another has been a change in the nature of the contact between the police and the public, 
“as the police now more frequently approach members of the public with an attitude of 
suspicion and distrust as they search for signs of criminal character and likely future 
criminal behavior.”71 
 
One impetus for this shift in policing is the well-known “broken windows” approach 
that began in the early 1980s during a period of high crime rates in the United States.72 This 
method is based on the belief that failure to address minor crimes that contribute to a 
community’s sense of fear — such as public intoxication, rowdy people on the street, and 
groups or individuals verbally accosting passers-by — will lead to more serious crime 
because of the perception that police are not interested in maintaining public order.73 
Responding to these minor crimes is seen as a way for police to deter more serious ones. 
 
Tyler, Jackson, and Mentovich suggest that the original “broken windows” approach 
reflected collaboration between police and the community. Police focused on  
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those disorderly individuals whose behavior was viewed by the community as 
outside the rules of everyday social order (i.e., outside the communities’ normative 
consensus about appropriate behavior). In other words, in the original model, the 
norms being enforced reflected the norms of the general community.74  
 
Police also used a variety of methods to deter such aberrant behavior. As George 
Kelling, one of the originators of the approach, has said, “Neighborhood rules were to be 
enforced for the most part through non-arrest approaches ... so that arrest would only be 
resorted to when other approaches failed.”75 
 
The shift to “zero-tolerance” policing, however, was based on a belief that stopping 
people for minor crimes would reveal that some of them were engaged in more serious 
crimes or had outstanding warrants.76 A RAND report describes this approach: 
 
A zero tolerance strategy consists of stopping, questioning, and frisking 
pedestrians or drivers considered to be acting suspiciously and then 
arresting them for offenses whenever possible, typically for such low-level 
offenses as possessing marijuana. A defining difference between zero 
tolerance interventions and other strategies is that zero tolerance strategies 
are not discerning; the focus is on making stops and arrests to crack down on 
all types of disorder, generically defined.77 
 
As a result, in New York, the reason for apprehending persons engaged in low-level 
offenses shifted from promoting a climate of social order to catching more serious 
criminals.78 The reasoning became that “[s]topping and frisking numerous ordinary 
citizens … would make the people carrying illegal guns fear that their weapons would be 
discovered during an arrest for a more minor offense.”79 Stopping more people thus 
increased the odds that at least some of them were persons engaged in serious crimes.  
 
Police therefore began “to draw a larger segment of the community into the criminal 
justice system for minor lifestyle crimes, with many of those people being more integral 
members of the community, not outsiders or ‘marginal’ people.”80 Despite its name, the 
zero-tolerance approach could never be strictly implemented as a practical matter. There 
are simply not enough police to stop everyone engaged in minor legal violations. Police 
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inevitably will have to exercise discretion about whom to stop. As several scholars who 
have studied police operations have documented, the policy of zero tolerance combined 
with reliance on implicit racial stereotypes in implementing that policy resulted in a 
substantial increase in arrests and incarceration of racial and ethnic minorities.81 For 
instance, 85 percent of marijuana arrests in New York City in 2016 were of blacks and 
Latinos, and 15 percent were of non-Latino whites.82 National data indicate, however, that 
the same percentage of people in each of these groups use marijuana. Moreover, among 
people ages 18 to 25, a higher percentage of non-Latino whites use marijuana than blacks 
and Latinos.83  
 
Reliance on preventive logic continued to expand in the late 1990s and into the 
2000s, with police stopping individuals not overtly engaged in any crime but whom police 
suspected might be illegally in possession of contraband or guns. New York City’s stop-and-
frisk program, which was struck down in 2014, was a prominent example of this 
approach.84 It resulted in more than 4.4 million stops by police between 2004 and 2012, 
most of which involved members of minority groups.85 The two most common reasons for 
a stop were that the individual was in a “high-crime area” (55 percent) or had exhibited 
“furtive movements” (42 percent), both of which gave the police expansive discretion.86  
 
While the New York City stop-and-frisk program has ended, aggressive preventive 
policing is likely to continue in other forms. A study of 100 million traffic stops between 
2011 and 2018 found, when controlling for relevant variables, that decisions about whom 
to stop, and whom to search during a stop, have a disproportionate impact on “black and 
Hispanic drivers.”87 Similarly, in a study conducted by Charles Epp, Steven Maynard-
Moody, and Donald Haider-Markel on traffic stops, African Americans were pulled over 
much more often than whites “for more arbitrary, and often unexplained, reasons.”88 Only 8 
percent of white drivers were given no reason for the stop, while almost 18 percent of 
African Americans were given no reason.89 When officers did give a reason, about twice as 
many black drivers as white drivers were stopped for highly discretionary reasons such as 
driving too slowly, having a burned-out license plate light, or simply to check whether the 
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driver had an outstanding arrest warrant, which is not legal authority for a stop.90 Whites 
and blacks are equally likely, however, to be stopped for serious traffic violations such as 
speeding.91 Thus, as the authors conclude, the wide racial disparity in the likelihood of 
being stopped is confined to discretionary stops for minor traffic violations.92 “Police have 
told us,” the authors state, “they use drivers’ minor violations of the law when they want to 
investigate the driver on suspicion of criminal activity.”93 Since race is such a strong 
influence in such stops, it is not hard to imagine why many African Americans believe that 
“[i]nstead of respecting those in the community, the police view them as potential criminals 
and wrongdoers.”94  
 
Some may claim that police stop racial and ethnic minorities more often because the 
percentage of crimes they commit is higher, in some cases substantially so, than the 
percentage of the population that is made up by members of these groups.95 The problem 
with this claim is that the vast majority of racial and ethnic minorities commit no crimes. 
Police are justified in stopping and questioning them only on the basis of individual 
evidence of suspected wrongdoing. Racial or ethnic minority status does not constitute 
such evidence. To treat it as such is to impose a form of collective responsibility for the 
wrongdoing of others on law-abiding individuals who share a physical characteristic with 
those criminals. 
 
The experience with aggressive preventive policing thus indicates that even when it 
does not rely on overt military tactics and equipment, it can subtly shift officers’ 
orientation so that it resembles the mindset of a warrior in a hostile environment. Military 
forces in a theater of conflict see themselves as fighting enemies who are not part of their 
community. They regard others as potential hostile actors, rather than persons who are 
presumptively benign. When enemies are embedded in the community and do not wear 
uniforms, this attitude of suspicion can extend to a large portion of people in the 
community. As in asymmetric military conflict, enemies may receive aid from the local 
population in various forms. This widens the universe of suspects to include those who 
may be assisting the enemy. Some police thus may regard patrolling a neighborhood in 
America as akin to patrolling one in a military conflict abroad.  
While the military does not officially use the term, soldiers on the front lines have 
sometimes used the category of “military-age males” to refer to potentially hostile 
persons.96 This can shape how ambiguous behavior is interpreted in ways that result in 
loss of innocent life.97 Similarly, police officers may view young men of color as presumed 
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suspects rather than as fellow citizens, which could lead an officer to construe ambiguous 
behavior as hostile, something that could prompt an escalation in the use of force.  
 
Racial and Ethnic Minorities and the “Danger Imperative” 
 
Police perception of being in constant danger may increase the likelihood that the 
behavior of young men of color will be construed as threatening. Michael Sierra-Arévalo 
suggests that police officers’ understanding of their work is powerfully shaped by what he 
calls “the danger imperative,”98 a cultural frame that emphasizes the constant danger of 
lethal violence against police officers. According to Sierra-Arévalo, information that the 
police receive is 
 
interpreted through the frame of the danger imperative, [with] emphasis placed on 
person-to-person violence in the line of duty. This “social amplification” 
dramatically highlights statistically rare events, such as in the re-telling of 
departmental “war stories” that provide officers with vivid evidence of just how 
dangerous their work is.99  
 
 This perspective leads police to be ever-alert to the possibility of violence in their 
encounters with individuals, which in turn creates the risk of escalation. Given the 
prevalence of the danger imperative among the police, increasing the number of 
interactions with citizens through aggressive preventive policing increases the number of 
occasions on which police may regard individuals not only as suspects but as potential 
threats. This form of policing thus can produce more encounters in which police 
communicate that people in a community cannot be trusted. 
 
Furthermore, an officer’s reliance on implicit racial assumptions may intensify a sense of 
danger, so that a large percentage of police interactions with members of minority groups 
become adversarial. For instance, while he stresses the limitations of his study, recent 
experimental research by Scott Phillips indicates that whether a person is black, along with 
the time of day and the person’s manner of clothing, is statistically significant in 
contributing to the formation of suspicion by police officers.100 The interaction between the 
danger imperative and the perception that minority group members are especially likely to 
pose a threat suggests that, in addition to its other impacts, aggressive preventive policing 
may increase the risk that police will use lethal force against racial and ethnic minorities.  
 
Effects of Aggressive Preventive Policing on Crime 
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Evidence suggests that using more frequent stops to cast a wide net in the hope of 
catching serious criminals is ineffective in preventing crime. The Committee to Review 
Research on Police Policy and Practices, for instance, concluded that, with respect to 
“undifferentiated intensive enforcement activities, studies fail to show consistent or 
meaningful crime or disorder prevention benefits.”101 In addition, analysis of the stop-and-
frisk program in New York City indicates that, between 2003 and 2009, only 0.15 percent 
of stops yielded guns, 1.09 percent produced weapons other than guns, and 1.7 percent 
yielded contraband.102  
 
Franklin Zimring has conducted an especially careful study of the extent to which 
different police policies contributed to New York City’s greater decline in crime compared 
with the rest of America during a time of substantial decline in crime across the country, 
beginning in the early 1990s. One such policy he examines is “the very aggressive use of 
stops by the police, stop and frisk procedures, and arrests of suspicious persons for minor 
crimes to remove them from being an immediate threat and to identify persons with 
outstanding warrants.”103 He concludes that there are “no plausible indications” that this 
approach helped prevent crime.104 Beyond New York City, Zimring’s 2008 analysis of the 
national decline in crime cautioned that the decline “was a surprise when it began and is a 
mystery to this day. … [T]here is little consensus among experts about what changes in 
circumstances produced the crime decline.”105 
 
 Even if aggressive preventive policing has contributed to a decline in crime, Zimring 
notes that “aggressiveness in policing is a costly strategy because it imposes real 
disadvantages on exactly the minority poor who can least afford additional handicaps.”106 
We need to investigate what these costs are. Jeffrey Fagan and his colleagues have noted, 
with respect to aggressive street stops, the harm of “stigma and internalized psychological 
costs” for the 95 percent of people who are innocent in these stops.107 Epp, Maynard-
Moody, and Haider-Markel’s study of traffic stops observes that “every stop justified by a 
minor violation, every inquisitive question, every light shined in a passenger compartment, 
every request for consent to search, every search, and every handcuffing of a person only to 
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release them later causes harm.”108 Similarly, the 2015 Department of Justice report on the 
Ferguson Police Department found that African American residents “described being 
belittled, disbelieved, and treated with little regard for their legal rights.”109 
A subtler cost is heightened police suspicion of and distance from the communities 
they serve, thus increasing officers’ perception that individuals are threatening and that 
force is necessary to subdue them. As the Ferguson report suggested, this adversarial 
posture can undermine efforts to reduce crime because it can “increase distrust and 
significantly decrease the likelihood that individuals will seek police assistance even when 
they are victims of crime, or that they will cooperate with the police to solve or prevent 
other crimes.”110 
 
In sum, the practice of aggressive preventive policing reflects cultural militarization 
because it relies on a view of minority groups as a segment of the population that is 
especially likely to pose threats from which police must protect society. It aims to prevent 
crime by focusing more intensive police attention on racial and ethnic minorities, based on 
the view that this is likely to identify wrongdoers who should be kept off the streets. This 
conceives of minority communities as adversaries whose members should be approached 
as suspects rather than fellow citizens. To the extent that police perceptions of personal 
danger are implicitly shaped by these assumptions, more frequent interaction between 
police and suspects also creates the risk of greater use of police violence. As the next 
section describes, the trend toward more heavily armed patrol officers may increase the 




Heavily Armed Regular Police 
Another aspect of cultural militarization is the belief that regular police officers 
need military-grade weapons to do their job. While the possession of such weapons 
represents a material dimension (something I will discuss in more detail in the next 
section), the conviction that police officers need them reflects a subtle cultural shift in the 
understanding of the nature of police work. This conviction rests on three questionable 
assumptions: that police and criminals are engaged in an arms race; that mass shootings 
are becoming more common; and, in the view of at least some in the law enforcement 
community, that a “war on cops” has arisen in recent years. 
 
A Domestic Arms Race 
 
The iconic event that sparked concern about an arms race was a 1997 shootout in 
North Hollywood, California, between two heavily armed bank robbers and the Los Angeles 
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police.111 The two criminals had three different types of semi-automatic rifles, which had 
been modified to enable fully automatic fire. They also wore mostly homemade, heavy-
plated body armor that protected them from handgun rounds and shotgun pellets fired by 
the police. The two men fired approximately 1,100 total rounds. According to one report, 
“During the gun battle, police officers were forced to run to a local gun store and take rifles 
to try to contend with the robbers’ firepower and body armor.”112  
 
Following the shootout, many police departments across the country began issuing 
semi-automatic weapons to regular officers. A decade later, CNN reported that there was a 
“war on the streets” in which the acquisition of greater firepower by criminals was leading 
police to say that they were in “an arms race.”113 The article reported a police officer in 
Palm Beach County, Florida, saying, “[Criminals] don’t have .38s anymore. They have AK-
47s. …They have automatic weapons now.”114 The Miami police chief reported that the 
department was in the process of providing an assault rifle to every officer based on 
concerns that AK-47s and assault weapons from former Soviet bloc countries were flooding 
into southern Florida.115 
The Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence argues that the 2004 expiration of the 
federal ban on assault weapons has intensified the arms race, and that “[p]olice officers 
need to be able to defend themselves and the rest of us, and they need the weapons to do 
so.”116 “This is a national problem,” said the Miami police chief. “Police agencies all over the 
U.S. are going to bigger weapons.”117  
Despite this perception of an arms race, the most current data from the FBI indicate 
that, of the 10,265 murders involving a firearm in the United States in 2018, handguns 
were used in 6,603 of them and rifles of any kind in only 297.118 Phillips, a criminal justice 
scholar, describes the belief that military-style assault weapons are commonly used in 
homicides as a “myth,” noting that police rarely recover such weapons in their 
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operations.119 All this casts doubt on the claim that criminals are arming themselves with 
increasingly intensive weapons that require police to respond in kind. 
 
Mass Casualty Attacks 
 
The conviction that regular police need more firepower also stems from prominent 
mass casualty attacks that have taken place in recent years, which involved both “active 
shooters” who attempted to kill a large number of people in a confined space and “hybrid 
targeted violence” that aimed to harm an identified population using multiple weapons and 
tactics.120  
 
 The shooting at Columbine High School in Colorado in 1999 “brought about a sea 
change in police tactics” in such situations.121 At Columbine, local police responded but did 
not enter the school to attempt to stop the shooters for more than half an hour because 
they were waiting for a SWAT team to arrive. At that time, SWAT teams were used for 
hostage incidents or cases in which suspects barricaded themselves. As a result of 
Columbine, however, where shooters focused on “quickly killing people at random,” the law 
enforcement community concluded that a faster response was necessary.122  
 
One police chief described how his department prepared for regular police officers 
serving as first responders in such incidents: 
 
We have obtained a great deal of equipment for these types of incidents. We 
have purchased AR-15 style weapons for all sworn personnel. We have 
converted all our patrol vehicle shotguns to a type of breaching shotgun. We 
have purchased tactical vests with ceramic plates that are placed in every 
patrol vehicle. Supervisors have rams/sledge-hammers as well as other 
breaching tools in their vehicles. We are currently testing and evaluating 
additional breaching equipment to be placed in every patrol vehicle.123  
 
Data indicate an increase in active-shooter events in recent years. Prior to 2014, the 
year the FBI began to issue annual reports on active-shooter incidents, a report on active-
shooter incidents that took place between 2000 and 2013 indicated that 160 incidents 
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causing 486 deaths occurred during this period.124 An average of 6.4 incidents per year 
occurred between 2000 and 2006, a number that jumped to an average of 16.4 between 
2007 and 2013.125 Between 2014 and 2019, there were 145 active-shooter incidents 
resulting in 495 deaths.126 Annual casualties rose from 34 between 2000 and 2013 to 99 
between 2014 and 2019. The number of incidents has ranged from 20 each year between 
2014 and 2016 to 30 in 2017.127 The percentage increase in active-shooter incidents and 
casualties since 2000 is thus substantial. At the same time, however, they remain extremely 
rare events to which few regular officers will ever have to respond. Departments 
nonetheless believe that all officers should be prepared to do so.  
 
  A category of violent incidents that has recently emerged is hybrid targeted 
violence. These assaults “often use a combination of lethal conventional weapons (i.e., fire 
as a weapon, firearms, improvised explosive devices, chemical weapons, etc.) and a 
combination of well-planned tactics (i.e., ambush, breaching, barricading, maneuver, 
etc.).”128 Prominent examples of hybrid targeted violence include attacks by Islamic State 
members at the Brussels airport in 2016, in Paris in November 2015, and Nairobi in 2013; 
the bombing at the Boston Marathon in 2013; and attacks in Mumbai in 2008. While these 
are disturbing events, the total number of terrorist attacks worldwide decreased by 50 
percent between 2014 and 2019, and the total number of deaths decreased by 54 
percent.129 Between Sept. 11, 2001, and 2020, a total of 243 persons died in terrorist 
attacks in the United States, with the largest number due to attacks by domestic far right-
wing groups.130 The FBI indicates that the dominant feature of the latter type of attack is a 
lone gunman.131 The average officer on patrol thus is highly unlikely to encounter hybrid 
targeted violence. 
 
According to Phillips’ study of the police’s increasing possession of patrol rifles, such 
as the MP5, AR-15, or M16, police believe they need military-grade equipment to deal with 
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more active-shooter and terrorist incidents.132 These firearms were previously used almost 
exclusively by police paramilitary units, but are now being issued to officers on the street. 
While there is little empirical research on this phenomenon, the 2007 Law Enforcement 
Management and Administrative Statistics survey indicates that 68.4 percent of police 
departments “issue or authorize assault weapons as a secondary firearm system.”133  
 
And yet, the number of homicides involving police officers has fallen in the United 
States since 1973, and most homicides, including of police officers on duty, occur with 
handguns.134 Phillips maintains that it is unlikely that patrol rifles will increase shooting 
accuracy, referring to research that concludes that officers using semi-automatic sidearms 
are no more accurate than officers using revolvers.135 Despite these considerations, Phillips 
says that increasing use of the patrol rifle is consistent with police narratives of “crime 
prevention, crime-fighting, and danger,” and the fear that police will be outgunned in the 
scenarios they are increasingly likely to encounter. For this reason, he says, police 
departments may feel the need to issue patrol rifles to officers regardless of empirical 
evidence casting doubt on the need for them.136 
 
The “War on Cops” 
 
Finally, some believe that police need to be more heavily armed to defend 
themselves in an ongoing “war on cops.”137 Those who maintain that there is such a war 
argue that there is an increasing number of attacks on police officers motivated by hatred 
of police and the desire for revenge for police killings of citizens.138 As the president of the 
National Fraternal Order of Police wrote to President Barack Obama in 2016, “There is a 
very real and very deliberate campaign to terrorize our nation’s law enforcement 
officers.”139 Proponents of this view argue that the events surrounding the police killing of 
Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, in 2014 have been the primary catalyst for this form 
of violence.140 
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However, most empirical research casts doubt on claims that a war on police is 
ongoing.141 FBI annual reports on officers killed by felonious acts found 48 such incidents 
in 2019, a decrease from 55 in 2010.142 While there may be more than one explanation for 
this decline, it is consistent with the broader downward trend since 1973. With the 
exception of a rise to 72 in 2011 and a sharp decline in 2013 to 27, the number of officers 
killed by a felonious act each year has ranged from 46 to 66, with no clear pattern. In 
addition, a report by the Department of Justice indicates that “there are substantial 
differences in the extent of risk for officers across comparable cities and counties,” based 
on local conditions.143  
 
Sierra-Arévalo observes that the danger imperative framework provides a powerful 
filter through which police interpret information, leading them to view their work as 
dangerous despite data to the contrary:  
 
That policing is growing statistically safer over time is of little consequence 
to officers on patrol, particularly if they or their fellow officers have been 
direct or vicarious victims of violence. What matters is the collective 
perception of police work as dangerous, and the shared expectation of 
officers to protect themselves and one another from violence.144  
 
 A pervasive perception among police is that they need to be more heavily armed 
because they are in an arms race with criminals; active-shooter and hybrid targeted 
violence incidents now pose a greater risk to ordinary police officers; and the police need 
to defend themselves from an escalating “war on cops.” However, empirical evidence does 
not suggest that this perception is accurate. Nevertheless, it has become an article of faith 
in most police departments and among most officers.  
 
Assessing Cultural Militarization 
 
The cultural dimension of militarization involves incorporating military beliefs and 
values into the conception of the police officer’s role. This is most evident in the notion that 
police are engaged in a war on drugs and terror, and that police must defend themselves in 
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a war that is being waged against them. Cultural militarization is reflected more subtly in 
the belief that police must engage in aggressive preventive operations, which can lead them 
to regard certain persons, especially members of minority groups, as outsiders — as 
suspects or enemies rather than fellow citizens. All of this contributes to a growing 
conception in recent years that the work of police officers more closely resembles the work 
of the military. 
The result is that a police officer now may see himself as a soldier patrolling a 
theater of conflict who must be alert to the presence of enemies and suspected hostiles. 
This can lead him to construe ambiguous behavior as threatening and to resolve 
uncertainty by using lethal force to defend himself. This may occur especially when an 
officer confronts a member of a minority group. Greater interaction between police and 
individuals due to aggressive preventive policing therefore may increase the likelihood of 




THE MATERIAL DIMENSION OF MILITARIZATION 
 
In this section, I examine those material dimensions of militarization that have become 
most prominent in the public eye: the expansive deployment of police paramilitary units, 
such as SWAT teams, and the acquisition of military equipment by police. Research 
indicates a striking increase in the percentage of police departments that have paramilitary 
units since the 1980s. These units overwhelmingly are used to serve drug warrants, rather 
than to respond to hostage, siege, or active-shooter situations. While there is a paucity of 
empirical research on the topic, the studies that do exist conclude that the use of 
paramilitary units has no appreciable effect on crime. Data also indicate a substantial 
increase since the 1990s in police departments with military equipment. Research on the 
effects of acquiring such equipment draws mixed conclusions, but most studies indicate 
that it does not affect crime rates. Finally, there are indications that paramilitary units are 
used more frequently in minority communities, and some studies suggest a relationship 
between the acquisition of military equipment and the percentage of racial and ethnic 
minorities in a community.  
 
 




A prominent example of police militarization in the public mind is the use of police 
paramilitary units, exemplified by SWAT teams. These were first established in 
Philadelphia in 1964, but were refined by the Los Angeles Police Department in response to 
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the Watts riots in 1965.145 The Los Angeles Police Department asked the military to help 
train these units, which were explicitly modeled on military special operations forces. 
Other jurisdictions soon established their own SWAT teams, whose responsibility was to 
respond to riots, hostage situations, barricaded suspects, and terrorist attacks.146 
 
 Data on SWAT teams are hard to find. Maryland provided information on SWAT 
activities from 2011 to 2014, but legislation requiring such disclosure expired.147 Utah now 
is the only state that reports on these operations. The percentage of cities with populations 
of 50,000 or more with SWAT teams is estimated to have increased from 59 percent in 
1982 to 89 percent in 1995, while the percentage of towns with populations between 
25,000 and 50,000 with SWAT teams increased from 26 percent in 1984 to 80 percent in 
2005.148 Peter Kraska and Shannon Williams estimate that in the early 1980s there were 
about 3,000 SWAT team deployments, and that by 2011 there were approximately 
60,000.149 A survey of SWAT team activity in 254 police departments of all sizes found that 
over 60 percent of departments had their own SWAT team in 2013.150 The number of calls 
deemed to require deployment of a SWAT unit was fairly steady between 2009 and 2013, 
with the mean number of calls around 8,000 and the mode around 3,100.151 
 
 The most striking aspect of SWAT team deployments is their extensive use beyond 
the limited situations for which they were created. The vast majority of deployments 
involve warrant enforcements for drug searches. One study that analyzed Maryland data 
from 2011 to 2014 found that about 90 percent of the 8,244 SWAT deployments in that 
four-year period were to serve search warrants.152 A study by the American Civil Liberties 
Union of over 3,800 SWAT deployments from 2011 to 2012 found that 79 percent involved 
home searches and more than 60 percent involved searches for drugs. Only 7 percent were 
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for hostage, barricade, or active-shooter scenarios.153 Since Utah began providing reports 
in 2014, between 77 and 83 percent of SWAT deployments have been to execute drug 
warrants.154 
 
 Research by Kraska and Kappeler on the use of paramilitary units by almost 550 law 
enforcement agencies between 1980 and 1995 indicates that this trend began in the 
1980s.155 Between 1980 and 1983, the mean number of deployments was 13 per year, or 
about one a month. The number more than doubled by 1986, almost tripled by 1989, and 
quadrupled by 1995. Of the almost 200 departments that had had paramilitary units since 
1980, and that provided complete data for the period, activity increased by 538 percent.156 
For all departments in the study in 1995, there were 25,201 deployments — “high risk 
warrant work” (mostly “drug raids”) accounted for 75.9 percent of these, while barricaded 
persons accounted for 13.4 percent, hostage situations for 3.6 percent, civil disturbances 
for 1.3 percent, and terrorist incidents for .09 percent.157  
 
 Police serving a warrant are required by law to knock on the door, announce their 
presence, and wait for an answer. They may obtain a “no-knock” warrant, however, if they 
have reasonable suspicion that advance notice would risk a violent response or allow 
destruction of evidence. The Supreme Court has held, however, that even when police 
should have announced their presence but did not, any evidence seized in the search may 
be introduced at trial.158 No-knock search warrants are allowed in every state except 
Oregon, where they are prohibited by state law, and in Florida, where they are banned 
under a state Supreme Court decision. 
 
There is reason to believe that a considerable number of drug or gun raids involve 
forcible entry. The American Civil Liberties Union study of SWAT deployments concluded 
that forcible entry likely occurred in 65 percent of drug searches.159 Utah reports that 
between 45 and 61 percent of entries have been forcible since 2014.160 One recent 
ethnographic study of SWAT team drug operations by Brian Schaefer in a city he calls 
“Bourbonville” found that there was little difference in practice between a raid in which 
police announced their presence and a no-knock raid. Of the 73 warrants served from April 
2013 through September 2014, every entry involved using a battering ram to break down 
the door:  
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The detectives announce their presence and purpose in conjunction with the first hit 
on the door. A detective explained, “As long as we announce our presence, we are 
good we don’t want to give them any time to destroy evidence or grab a weapon, so 
we go fast and get through the door quick.”161 
 
According to Radley Balko, the typical SWAT team operates with military-style 
clothing, including camouflage, and equipment, which includes “Kevlar helmets and vests; 
gas masks, knee pads, gloves, communication devices, and boot knives; and military-grade 
weapons, such as the Heckler and Koch MP5 submachine gun.”162 When teams conduct 
raids, they do so at night or just before dawn. In these operations, police usually break 
down the door with a battering ram or explosives, sometimes detonate a flashbang grenade 
to stun the occupants, and instruct everyone inside to remain in the prone position at 
gunpoint. 163 
 
Balko suggests that drug raids can create scenarios in which alarmed residents may 
use a weapon, leading police to believe it is necessary to use lethal force to defend 
themselves.164 A New York Times study of SWAT team drug raids from 2010 to 2016 found 
that 81 civilians and 13 law enforcement officers died during such operations, although it 
did not describe the circumstances under which the deaths occurred nor did it indicate the 
number of incidents that it reviewed.165  
 It was a no-knock drug raid that resulted in the highly publicized death of Breonna 
Taylor in Louisville in March 2020. Three Louisville police officers executing a no-knock 
warrant shortly after midnight used a battering ram to force open Taylor’s front door. 
Police said that they knocked several times and announced themselves without getting an 
answer before they forcibly entered. Taylor’s boyfriend Kenneth Walker said that he and 
Taylor heard knocking, asked who it was, and got no response.166 When police entered, 
Walker drew his gun and fired. In the ensuing gunfire, Taylor was shot eight times and a 
Louisville police officer was injured. In records of Walker’s emergency 911 call that were 
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released afterward, Walker said, "I don't know what happened ... somebody kicked in the 
door and shot my girlfriend."167  
A 2008 study of SWAT team deployments from 1986 to 1998, however, found that 
“perhaps the most notable aspect of the deadly force findings is that SWAT officers rarely 
discharge their firearms at human targets.”168 The survey found that, across tens of 
thousands of operations, only 342 involved gunfire. In those operations, SWAT team fire 
struck almost 200 citizens, killing 139 of them.169 Similarly, Jonathan Mummolo’s study of 
8,244 SWAT deployments in Maryland found that nine civilians died, representing 0.11 
percent of the deployments.170 Another study found no difference between SWAT officers 
and regular officers in the frequency with which they used force.171 Utah data indicate that, 
in 2,370 deployments from 2014 to 2018, suspects brandished weapons in 85 cases, 
officers fired shots in 14 cases, and there were five civilian deaths and one officer death.172 
Unfortunately, information is not available about the specific circumstances in which police 
fired weapons or individuals died. 
 Notwithstanding these figures, SWAT raids are extremely violent events that 
involve the use of weapons and tactics associated more with military operations than 
police work. The message is that police are agents of the state authorized to use intense 
violence against anyone who poses a threat, and that everyone in the home is a suspect and 
ongoing force can be used if they do not fully comply with orders. This type of operation, 
and the assumptions that underlie it, is characteristic of the use of military force against 
enemies — not law enforcement activities to protect fellow citizens.  
Finally, a prominent feature of SWAT operations is their frequent deployment in 
African American communities, even after controlling for crime rates.173 The American Civil 
Liberties Union’s study of SWAT operations found that 42 percent of SWAT search 
warrants were for African Americans suspects and 12 percent were for Latino suspects.174 
Of all persons affected by SWAT raids in drug cases, 61 percent were from minority 
communities.175   
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 SWAT team operations thus have grown beyond the originally envisioned high-risk 
scenarios to encompass what some regard as routine police work. The American Civil 
Liberties Union maintains, “The use of the SWAT team to execute a search warrant 
essentially amounts to the use of paramilitary tactics to conduct domestic criminal 
investigations and searches of people’s homes.”176 Similarly, Kraska argues that the use of 
SWAT teams has “normaliz[ed] itself into a range of proactive and mainstream police 
functions.”177  
 
Kraska regards this as an unwarranted expansion of the definition of a high-risk situation 
calling for specialized expertise outside conventional police operations. On the other hand, 
Schaefer notes that the detectives in his study of drug raids “refer to the often violent 
tendencies of the people targeted by this group, and the violent background as a key factor 
in the use of police raids. This line of thought follows the increasing logic that criminals are 
becoming well-armed, making the detectives job more dangerous than ever.”178  
 
 Assessing these claims is difficult in light of the available information on SWAT team 
operations, which simply lists these teams as serving warrants without distinguishing 
between high-risk and routine, low-risk situations. Calls for greater disclosure about these 
operations should include more information about this level of detail. Even if such 
information were available, however, it would not indicate the evidence on the basis of 
which a raid is characterized as high risk. This suggests that an important means of 
ensuring accountability for SWAT operations is judicial scrutiny of warrant requests.  
 
Effects of Creating and Deploying Paramilitary Units 
 
 How effective has the increased use of SWAT teams been in meeting law 
enforcement goals? To date, there is sparse empirical research on this question because of 
the lack of information on these operations. Mummolo reviewed national data on 9,000 law 
enforcement agencies and on Maryland’s use of SWAT teams to assess the effect on violent 
crime and police officer safety.179 For the national study, he analyzed the effect of acquiring 
a SWAT unit, while for Maryland he assessed the impact of SWAT deployments in general 
and for barricade situations specifically. He found that there were no statistically 
significant effects in either case on violent crime or officer safety.180 
 
 Scott Phillips, Andrew Wheeler, and Dae-Young Kim evaluated the effects of 39 
police paramilitary unit raids during a two-day period in Buffalo in 2012.181 They measured 
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effects by changes in calls for police service, drug arrests, and Part 1 crimes as designated 
by the FBI, which are the most serious. They found that calls for service, arrests, and 
nonviolent Part 1 crimes increased in locations with raids compared to similar locations, 
and that there was no statistically significant effect on violent Part 1 crimes. They did find 
evidence of a slight decline in all types of Part 1 crimes two weeks after an intervention, 
suggesting that, at best, police paramilitary unit raids have a “short-term deterrent effect 
on crime.”182 The absence of any significant deterrent effect led the authors to conclude 
that “using [SWAT raids] as a part of a strategic policy of crime reduction will have limited 
success.”183  
 
 Another study by Kim, Phillips, and Wheeler analyzed the same dataset on the city 
level and used a different time interval to measure the effect of paramilitary 
intervention.184 It found that the impact of intervention was greatest for property crimes 
such as robberies and larcenies. This impact lasted for some time and then diminished 
gradually. On the other hand, violent crimes did not decline nearly as much as property 
crimes, and rape increased significantly during the post-intervention period. Given a 
“quickly decaying deterrent effect” of these raids, the authors suggested that long-term 
crime deterrence should be based on “more holistic” approaches “beyond strictly 




Acquisition of Equipment 
 
 The most visible indications of militarization are military clothing and equipment 
used by police forces. There are 12 different government programs overseen by federal 
agencies that are authorized to provide law enforcement agencies with military 
equipment.186 The Department of Homeland Security furnishes the most funding to law 
enforcement agencies for military equipment, providing $4.1 billion in grants for the Law 
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Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Activities program from 2008 to 2015, although not all 
of this was for military equipment.187  
 
However, the program that has attracted the most public attention is the Section 
1033 program operated by the Department of Defense, which supplies surplus military 
equipment to law enforcement agencies. This began with Section 1208 of the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, which authorized the secretary 
of defense to transfer military equipment, including small arms and ammunition, for use in 
drug interdiction by state and local law enforcement agencies.188 Legislation in 1997 
enabled local agencies to use equipment for any law enforcement purpose, giving priority 
to drug enforcement.189 After the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks, counter-terrorism also became a 
prominent mission furthered by the program. Law enforcement agencies receive the 
equipment at little or no cost, but they must use the equipment within a year or send it 
back. It is not hard to see how this could lead police to use military equipment in some 
instances in which it is not necessary. 
 
In response to public concern about police militarization in the wake of the 
incidents in Ferguson, Obama created a working group in January 2015 to consider reform 
of the 1033 program. The group called for creating lists of “prohibited equipment” that 
could no longer be distributed to police and “controlled equipment” that could only be 
provided in response to a demonstrated need.190 The “prohibited equipment” included 
tracked armored vehicles and weaponized vehicles of any kind, rifles and ammunition of 
.50-caliber or higher, and grenade launchers. The “controlled equipment” included any 
specialized firearms, manned and unmanned aircraft, explosives, and riot gear. In 2016, the 
Defense Department began recalling previously issued surplus gear that had been placed 
on the prohibited equipment list. In August 2017, however, Trump eliminated all 
restrictions on the transfer of military equipment to law enforcement agencies.191 
 
The latest information from the Defense Logistics Agency’s Law Enforcement 
Support Office, which administers the 1033 program, indicates that $7.2 billion of 
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equipment has been transferred to law enforcement agencies since its inception, and that 
more than 8,000 law enforcement agencies have participated in the program.192  
 
A challenge in conducting research on the 1033 program has been that there was 
limited public information available about it until 2014. Moreover, a May 2020 paper by 
Kenneth Lowande maintains that prior research, both before and after 2014, is based on 
inaccurate data that do not take into account military equipment returned or destroyed, 
and conflates transfers between local agencies with new distributions from the Defense 
Department.193 This suggests taking some caution in evaluating the findings from research 
that does not account for these things. 
 
One study by David Ramey and Trent Steidley found that, between 1995 and 2016, 
participating local agencies received an annual average amount of almost $80,000 in 
equipment per 10,000 persons, including about $26,500 of militarized property and about 
$52,700 of non-militarized property.194 More than half the requests from departments 
were for drug enforcement operations.195 A 2016 study indicated that the percentage of the 
U.S. population residing in a jurisdiction in which the police department had received any 
military equipment from the 1033 program increased from 15 percent in 2009 to 29 
percent in 2014.196  
 
Steven Radil, Raymond J. Dezzani, and Lanny D. McAden calculated that, from 2006 
through 2013, approximately 2.3 million pieces of equipment were transferred to counties, 
at an estimated value of $1.5 billion, with 80 percent of all U.S. counties receiving some 
equipment.197 Vehicles accounted for about $900 million of the $1.5 billion, with 
“miscellaneous” items coming to just under $390 million.198 Since other categories include 
weapons, armored vehicles, communications and surveillance equipment, and personal 
protective equipment, the figures indicate that many of the items transferred are not for 
tactical military purposes. A report in June 2020 estimates that, as of March 2020, local law 
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enforcement agencies had received more than $850 million of equipment through the 
program since the events in Ferguson in 2014.199  
 
Research examining the geographical distribution of 1033 program equipment 
found that there were small clusters of high per capita acquisitions in the Southeast 
(especially in Tennessee and Alabama), the Southwest, and Montana.200 The authors 
suggest that this indicates the need to analyze how increasing police militarization reflects 
perceived law enforcement needs based on local conditions. The study also found that the 
acquisition of equipment mildly correlated with more populated jurisdictions, except for 
weapons, for which population size was negatively correlated.201 The study concluded that 
police militarization through the 1033 program “is not likely to be a phenomenon 
restricted to large urban police departments.”202  
 
Zach Baumgart drew on publicly available data from the Law Enforcement 
Management and Administrative Statistics survey, a data set on acquisition of equipment 
by 4,000 police departments from 1990 to 2007, to construct an index of militarization 
based on three dimensions: amount of military equipment, use of paramilitary tactics, and 
focus on military-style policing.203 He emphasized that militarization should be 
conceptualized on a continuum, rather than as a dichotomous characteristic.204 His study 
concluded that, controlling for relevant variables, there was a steady increase in 
militarization in these departments over that period. Baumgart noted an emerging 
convergence among departments, such that departments that were relatively militarized in 
1990 increased their rate of militarization slowly, while departments that were less 
militarized in 1990 increased at a faster rate.205 He concluded that the evidence indicates 
that police departments are becoming comparable in their level of militarization, “such that 
the militarized department simply becomes ‘the police’ in the next few decades.”206 
 
Several scholars have suggested that the militarization of police departments may 
be related to the racial and ethnic composition of the areas that they serve. The study by 
Ramey and Steidley found that, while violent crime rates predicted some of the likelihood 
of acquiring military equipment, the perception that members of minority communities 
pose a threat played a significant role in militarization. This is known as the “minority 
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threat” theory.207 Controlling for other variables, “[d]epartments in places with larger black 
populations are more likely to acquire militarized property through the 1033 program.”208 
Furthermore, “[f]or those departments that successfully acquire militarized property … 
[t]here is a nonlinear exponential relationship between the respective black and Hispanic 
populations” and the value of military equipment acquired. In other words, the rate of 
increase in the value of such equipment is considerably greater than the rate at which the 
black and Hispanic populations increase.209  
 
The study found that, controlling for other potentially relevant variables, the 
relationship between minority threat and participation in the 1033 program was 
statistically significant for acquisitions of militarized, but not non-militarized, 
equipment.210 That is, as the relative size of the minority population increases, police are 
more likely to acquire militarized equipment.211 The authors conclude that this finding 
provides support for the claim that police acquisition of combat equipment is in part a 
product of the perception that racial and ethnic minorities pose a threat to the 
community.212  
 
A study by Olugbenga Ajilore provides mixed support for the minority threat 
theory.213 It found that counties with a higher proportion of African Americans were less 
likely to acquire Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles, but counties with greater 
ethnic residential segregation were more likely to acquire them. As Ajilore concludes, 
“racial inequalities persist even when minority populations move to the suburbs, and 
corresponding police militarization is one such example of this phenomenon.”214 
 
Effects of Acquiring Equipment 
Research on the effects of acquiring military equipment is still in its early stages, but 
the number of studies has been increasing in recent years.215 It is important to remember 
Lowande’s word of caution in assessing these studies. Nevertheless, their findings are 
suggestive, especially since many arrive at similar conclusions that cast doubt on the value 
of acquiring and using such equipment. Two studies that found positive effects of acquiring 
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paramilitary equipment through the 1033 program were cited by Trump when he 
eliminated restrictions on the transfer of military equipment to law enforcement agencies, 
but their findings have been challenged recently. 
 One common way that scholars measure militarization is the value of military 
equipment acquired by police departments. A study by Vincenzo Bove and Evelina 
Gavrilova, for instance, analyzed equipment transfers to 8,000 local police agencies at the 
county level from 2006 to 2012.216 It found that a 10 percent increase in the value of 
military equipment acquired led to a drop in the number of crimes of 5.9 per 100,000 
persons. This included a decrease in robberies, assaults, burglaries, larcenies, and motor 
vehicle thefts. The authors found an insignificant effect on homicides. Moreover, receipt of 
military equipment did not affect the number of calls police received, the number of police 
officers assaulted or injured in the line of duty, or the number of offenders killed by the 
police. 
The authors also found that acquired “gears and vehicles” had “strong and sizable 
effects on all the types of crime.”217 They note that both these categories of equipment are 
easily observable, and suggest that their contribution to a decline in crime is consistent 
with the theory of “perceptual deterrence” based on reinforcement of a sense of police 
authority and legitimacy.218 
 A study by Matthew Harris et al. also examined the receipt of 1033 equipment by 
counties, focusing on the effects of acquiring military vehicles and tactical weapons.219 It 
found that a 1 percent increase in the number of tactical items reduced gun assaults on 
police officers by 0.1 percent and decreased the probability of gun assaults on officers by 
0.03 percent. Acquisition of vehicles had the largest effect on gun assaults, with a 10 
percent increase leading to a 3.5 percent decrease in assaults on police.220 The study also 
found that receiving tactical equipment reduced the probability that an officer would be 
killed in the line of duty.221 In addition, a 1 percent increase in tactical items led to a 0.25 
percent increase in arrests for drug sales and a 0.23 percent increase in arrests for drug 
possession. The authors did note, however, “We do find that tactical items lead to increased 
arrests for petty offenses, which raises some concern about more aggressive policing.”222 
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The authors also found that a 1 percent increase in tactical equipment led to a 0.27 percent 
decrease in complaints against police,223 and did not affect the number of deaths caused by 
police.224  
 A recent paper challenges the findings in these two studies, based on an analysis of 
individual law enforcement agencies rather than counties as a whole.225 Gunderson et al. 
note that, at the time of the research by Bove and Gavrilova and by Harris et al., the 
Department of Defense provided information on equipment transfers only at the county 
level. It did not begin identifying local law enforcement agency recipients until 2018. They 
argue that aggregating data at the county level obscures differences between agencies 
within a given county, which may result in inaccurate inferences about the effects of 
acquiring military equipment. 
 
 Gunderson et al. replicated the analyses done by Bove and Gavrilova and by Harris 
et al. on the agency level, using the same model and estimation strategy for each study. 
Their results differed significantly from those in both studies. With respect to Bove and 
Gavrilova, they concluded, “[W]e either find no significant effect of military aid on a variety 
of crime rates, or we find a significant and positive effect, as with the total crime rate 
variable.”226 In addition, Gunderson et al. replicated the Bove and Gavrilova analysis on the 
county level after adjusting for several inconsistencies between data previously released by 
the Defense Department and currently available data. They found the same result as in 
their analysis of individual law enforcement agencies. As a result, they declared, “We 
therefore cannot conclude definitively that military aid exerts any influence on crime rates, 
either at the county or at the agency level.”227 
 
Gunderson et al. conducted the same replication of the study by Harris et al. on the 
county and agency levels. Their analysis focused on the extent to which receiving military 
equipment affects rates of homicide, robbery, assault, and vehicle theft. They found no 
statistically significant effect on the rates of any of these crimes.228 On the county level, they 
did find an effect on homicide and assault rates. They noted, however, that these results 
reversed when disaggregated to the individual agency level, which reinforces the concern 
about the potential for misleading results when conducting analysis on the county level.229 
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 A 2016 paper by Federico Masera found mixed results when examining the 
acquisition of military equipment by individual agencies from 2000 to 2014.230 On the one 
hand, Masera concluded that, from 2007, when transfers of military equipment 
substantially increased, to 2014, each dollar per capita of military equipment was 
associated with a decline in violent crime by about 6.4 percent.231 Masera estimated that 
the violent crime rate between 2007 and 2014 decreased by 18.3 percent, but would have 
dropped by only 7.2 percent without the 1033 program.232 
 
 Masera did find, however, that there was some displacement of violent crime to 
surrounding areas, with the violent crime rate increasing by 0.5 per 1,000 persons in what 
he described as a “commuting zone” adjoining the jurisdiction of individual agencies. 
Decisions about acquiring military equipment at the agency level do not take this effect into 
account, which Masera describes as resulting in the “overmilitarization” of individual 
agencies. Masera’s study also found that each dollar per capita increase in military 
equipment was associated with an increase of killings by police of .08 per 100,000 persons, 
leading him to conclude that “the militarization of the police can explain all the recent 
increases in police killings” in the area he studied.233 
 
Several additional studies show mixed results or cast doubt on the effectiveness of 
material militarization. One 2017 study analyzed state-level purchases of military 
equipment from January 1991 to September 2015.234 It found that purchases of military 
clothing reduced assaults on police officers by 5.3 percent for each 100 purchases and 
armor reduced assaults by 7.6 percent per 100 purchases. The authors did not find any 
statistically significant effect of purchases of weapons. However, every 100 purchases of 
operational equipment — including cameras, night-vision goggles, audiovisual technology, 
disposal robots, spotlights, and mine detectors — increased the rate of assaults on officers 
by 4.6 percent.235  
 
This study suggests that the effect of clothing and armor in reducing assaults lends 
some support to the view that “the appearance an officer gives off is the most important 
factor influencing one’s decision to aggress.”236 The effect of operational equipment in 
increasing assaults, the authors speculated, could reflect citizen resentment of 
infringement on privacy and “growing discontent with police and their use of military-
grade equipment.”237 Research by Mummolo provides some support for this thesis. He 
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found that militarized images of police were associated with a 3.2-point decline in the 
desire for more police patrols in one’s neighborhood.238  
 
Another 2017 study examined the total value of military equipment transferred to 
counties in Connecticut, Maine, Nevada, and New Hampshire from 2006 to 2014.239 
Controlling for relevant variables, the authors found that receiving no military equipment 
corresponded with 0.287 expected civilian deaths by police in a county for a given year, 
while receiving the maximum amount of such equipment corresponds with 0.656 deaths. 
“In other words,” they write, “moving from the minimum to the maximum expenditure 
values, on average, increases civilian deaths by roughly 129%.”240 Counties that received 
no military equipment were estimated to have 0.068 fewer deaths than the previous year, 
while those receiving the maximum amount were estimated to have 0.188 more than the 
previous year.241 
 
 Edward Lawson Jr. constructed a militarization variable that measures the value of 
military equipment acquired under the 1033 program by 11,800 law enforcement agencies 
from the fourth quarter of 2014 through the fourth quarter of 2016.242 He found that the 
greater the level of militarization, as measured by his variable, the higher the number of 
deaths at the hands of the police. 
 
Lowande’s May 2020 paper noting concern about accurate 1033 program 
information found that about one in five weapons are returned or destroyed within five 
years. “I find,” he says, “that most changes in police militarization in the contemporary 
period are the result of weapons and equipment already in circulation, and that attrition of 
these weapons is common.”243 He suggests that trends in militarization through this 
program have leveled off, perhaps because of the withdrawal of many U.S. military 
personnel abroad. As a result, “the operative question facing interested parties is the 
potential effects of policy interventions that demilitarize departments with already 
acquired equipment.”244 
 
In an effort to identify the effects of such demilitarization, Lowande studied 
jurisdictions that returned equipment in response to the Defense Department recall during 
the Obama administration. He focused on a period from the second quarter of 2015 to the 
third quarter of 2016, which represents two quarters prior to demilitarization and two 
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quarters after it ended. Lowande found that the data indicate that there was little evidence 
that demilitarization had significant impacts on violent crime or officer safety.245 He 
acknowledges that his study is limited to the recall of certain types of military equipment 
under a particular government program, and with regard to several hundred police 
departments. It thus does not purport to establish the effects of demilitarization in general. 
Nonetheless, he concludes that his research suggests that there would be little risk from 





  Research indicates that SWAT teams are now regularly used in situations outside 
the emergency situations for which they were originally created. A large percentage of 
these operations involve forcible entries for drug searches. While there have been high-
profile incidents resulting in deaths, the very limited data that are available suggest that 
this occurs infrequently. Nonetheless, as videos of these operations vividly attest, forcible 
entries are extremely violent paramilitary intrusions that always carry the risk of 
exchanges of gunfire.247 In addition, a large percentage of these operations take place in 
minority communities. Given the limited use of firearms and low number of deaths during 
SWAT operations, it bears asking whether SWAT units are often used in situations where 
the risk is no greater than what a regular officer would face.  
The lack of detailed information on SWAT team operations makes it difficult to 
assess their effectiveness, but the few studies that exist cast doubt on their long-term 
effectiveness. Requiring more detailed information about SWAT deployments would be an 
important step in helping to ensure that these units are used only in genuinely high-risk 
situations when the use of regular police is not sufficient. 
The percentage of law enforcement agencies acquiring military equipment from the 
Department of Defense has been increasing since the creation of the 1033 program 
(although this represents only one source of such equipment, and so understates the larger 
trend). Most research on the impact of acquiring military equipment indicates it has little 
effect on crime or attacks on police, and some find that it is positively correlated with 
killings by police. In addition, one study finds that acquisition of combat equipment is 
correlated with a minority population, while another finds acquisition of military vehicles 
is associated with residential segregation. More work on the effects of material 
militarization will be necessary, however, to take into account recent refinements in 
available data that the Lowande paper describes. Despite the limited research in this area, 
it is striking that existing studies provide little evidence that material militarization has any 
effect on crime. 
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As with cultural militarization, the effect of increasing reliance on military tactics 
and equipment on crime is not the only consideration in assessing this trend. The 
combined effect of these two dimensions can result in situations in which police officers 
who are equipped with military-grade weapons confront those they regard as outsiders — 
especially members of minority communities — who are presumed to pose a threat. The 
resulting risk is a steep price to pay for reducing crime in any democratic country. 
Even when operations do not result in the use of force, the prominent display of 
weapons and use of military tactics highlight the possibility that it may be used. As the next 
section discusses, this communicates a distinct message about the relationship between the 
police and the community. 
 
THE SYMBOLIC DIMENSION OF MILITARIZATION 
 
Both material and cultural militarization have a symbolic dimension that goes to the 
heart of the relationship between the state and its citizens. Focusing on this dimension 
directs attention to how police practices and equipment are perceived by communities. In 
its symbolic dimension, militarization puts force in the foreground rather than the 
background, reversing a basic assumption about the police in a liberal democracy. 
 
 Peter Manning emphasizes the symbolic dimension of police operations by invoking 
the perspective of dramaturgy: a “way of seeing, using a theatrical metaphor to explore 
how the communication of messages to an audience conveys information and creates 
impressions that shape social interaction.”248 This enables us to see that “[p]olicing is at 
least in part a representation to which we look for the meaning of events. It is thus a 
translating device, a means to both amplify and reduce our sense of the fearful, the safe, the 
orderly, the risky, and the attractive.”249 
 Police encounters with individuals are therefore not simply physical interactions 
but performances that help normatively order the social world. As Manning observes, they 
are means by which honor and shame are distributed among different members of 
society.250 This reflects the authority of the police as state agents who celebrate and 
condemn behavior, so that encounters between police and individuals are “[d]ramas of 
control that communicate and affirm social norms.”251 Understanding police operations as 
dramatic performances illuminates that both material and cultural militarization have 
significance that goes beyond their physical consequences. 
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   With regard to material militarization, wearing military gear and brandishing 
military weapons is a performative display that communicates that the threat posed by 
those whom an officer confronts is grave enough that it may require police to respond with 
the type of intensive force that the military is authorized to use. These displays occur often 
in African American communities, and, as events in Ferguson and following the death of 
George Floyd indicate, in response to demonstrations about police use of force against 
African Americans.252 As a result, the police can convey to African Americans that they are 
outsiders who should fear the police, rather than citizens who should look to it for 
protection. Furthermore, this communicates to the larger public that African Americans are 
not fellow citizens who are worthy of respect, but outsiders who warrant suspicion. In this 
respect, as I have suggested, police displays of military weapons and tactics resemble a 
military show of force that is designed both to intimidate an adversary and reassure 
citizens that the government stands ready to protect them. 
A joint report released by the Department of Justice and the Institute for 
Intergovernmental Research after demonstrations in Ferguson underscored the symbolic 
impact of police tactics and equipment. As the report stated, “The decisions to deploy 
tactical officers, to use law enforcement military dress and appearance, to use military 
tactics (such as overwatch), and to use materiel … all contributed to the image of 
militarization.”253 The report said that police use of armored vehicles, for instance, “stirred 
the emotions of demonstrators” and caused them to feel fear, anger, and intimidation 
simply because of the vehicle’s presence.254 Members of the community described these as 
“tanks” and said that it “looked like the police were invading.”255 Similarly, having a sniper 
prominently in view to monitor threats created fear among peaceful demonstrators.256 
 
The report reflected an understanding of the symbolic dimension of militarization. It 
emphasized the importance of keeping paramilitary units and military equipment out of 
sight until it is necessary to use them.257 Similarly, it said that “armored vehicles should not 
be visible to protesters except in narrowly defined circumstances, for example when shots 
are fired and in some active shooter situations.”258 
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Material militarization has symbolic significance in that it communicates a 
departure from normal expectations regarding the role of police and how they use force. 
Good police work is “the craft of handling trouble without resort to coercion.”259 This is 
reflected in the rules governing the use of force by law enforcement officers. They require 
that force be used only as a last resort, that the amount of force be proportionate to the 
threat that it aims to address, and that lethal force be used only to protect life. 
 
These standards imply that the role of the police is as members of the social contract 
who are authorized to preserve peace and protect fellow citizens from harm. This requires 
treating citizens with respect, attempting first to use persuasion to restore order and 
prevent harm. Police always have the authority to use force, but force is in the background 
as a last resort. This reflects a working presumption that individuals are members of the 
social contract rather than people who threaten it. 
 
Shows of force by the police through measures such as SWAT team raids and 
displays of military equipment move force into the foreground. They can communicate that 
police regard the community as a threat to the social contract and that police are ready to 
use force to meet this threat. Even if they do not use force, police confront the community 
as agents of the state prepared to fight its enemies. 
Lieblich and Shinar emphasize how problematic it can be when military-style 
operations are used outside of emergencies and become normalized.260 When 
militarization becomes more common, the presumption that individuals from certain 
communities are outsiders who pose a threat can become a background assumption of 
daily life.261 The use of military weapons and tactics communicates to communities subject 
to them, as well as to the larger public, that certain individuals and groups pose a threat to 
the public that is more urgent than the need to control ordinary criminals through 
conventional policing methods.  
Cultural militarization also has a symbolic dimension. Tyler and his colleagues 
suggest that aggressive preventive policing expresses an adversarial rather than 
collaborative relationship, which places certain persons outside the community.262 Epp, 
Maynard-Moody, and Haider-Markel make a similar point in their study of traffic stops. The 
goal of investigatory stops, they argue, is to see “whether a person is up to no good,” which 
can prompt officers to act on the basis of implicit stereotypes.263 Such practices violate the 
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principle that “people should be treated as equal, respected members of society and not as 
second-class outsiders.”264  
 
As Paul Butler has observed, stop-and-frisk policing “causes many men of color to 
hate the police, and makes them less willing to engage with the government in any way, 
because the primary manifestation of the government in their lives — the police — treats 
them with such contempt.”265 James Forman Jr. describes the experience of students at a 
charter school in Washington, D.C., that he helped establish:  
As young people in a high-crime community, they were automatically viewed 
as potential enemies. This fact points to one of the most destructive aspects 
of modern policing. Although officers recognize some segments of the 
community — the shopkeepers, the pastors, the elderly grandmothers — as 
law-abiding citizens, they regard most neighborhood residents, and young 
people in particular, with generalized suspicion.266 
 Jerome Skolnick noted this tendency more than 50 years ago in his study of 
policing operations in “Westville”: 
The policeman … develops a perceptual shorthand to identify certain 
kinds of people as symbolic assailants, that is as persons who 
use gesture, language, and attire that the policeman has come to recognize as 
a prelude to violence … . The patrolman in Westville, and probably most 
communities, has come to identify the black man with danger.267  
  
The increase in material and cultural militarization in recent years continues a long 
trend in which policing is used to exercise control over African Americans who are viewed 
as outside the social contract and who ought, therefore, to be monitored and disciplined 
because of the threat they pose to the body politic. This history has generated the belief 
among many African Americans that the police are people from whom they need to protect 
themselves rather than people they can look to for protection. 
 There is not space here to recount this history in full, but it underscores the fact that 
concern about the symbolic role of material and cultural militarization in communicating a 
message of social control is not abstract or fanciful. That history includes a period of more 
than 200 years in which slave patrols in the South served as a “transitional” form of police, 
and in which police were used to enforce Jim Crow laws. In the North, it includes the rise of 
professional police forces to respond to what was regarded as the emergence of dangerous 
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lower classes that threatened social order. More subtly, it involved the use of policing to 
informally enforce patterns of racial segregation. 
 Slave patrols originally were part of the colonial militia but eventually became 
specialized forces that focused solely on enforcing state laws regulating slavery.268 These 
laws prohibited slaves from going beyond the boundaries of their masters’ property, 
requiring passes in order to do. Solomon Northup’s Twelve Years a Slave describes the role 
of patrols in enforcing these laws: 
Patrollers, whose business it is to seize and whip any slave they may find 
wandering from the plantation … ride on horseback, headed by a captain, 
armed, and accompanied by dogs. They have the right, either by law, or by 
general consent, to inflict discretionary chastisement upon a black man 
caught beyond the boundaries of his master’s estate without a pass, and even 
to shoot him, if he attempts to escape.269 
Patrols thus explicitly sought to prevent African Americans from attempting to become free 
citizens, and to return them to their status as lower forms of life not fit for participation in 
the larger community.   
 Furthermore, slave patrols were authorized to address perceived threats from 
slaves that went beyond their attempted escape. These included criminal acts of resistance 
such as theft, crop destruction, arson, and poisoning. Most ominous was the threat of slave 
revolts.270 Because of the need to discipline and regulate every aspect of slaves’ lives to 
forestall such threats, “[t]he hallmark of slave patrolling was the belief that every facet of 
black life was suspect, warranting aggressive police intervention and criminal 
investigations.”271 This involved unrestrained search and seizures of slave quarters and 
immediate physical punishment for even minor infractions.272  
 During the Jim Crow-era in the South, police reinforced a racial hierarchy by 
enforcing segregation and vagrancy and loitering statues known as the “Black Codes.”273 
Sandra Bass notes that “African-Americans were also prohibited from engaging in a broad 
range of ‘disorderly offenses’ such as using insulting gestures of language, engaging in 
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malicious mischief, preaching the Gospel without a license, or taking on employment other 
than as farmers or servants without paying an annual tax.”274 
 The sentiment behind such laws was expressed well by the editor of the Lynchburg 
Virginian in 1865: 
[S]tringent police regulations may be necessary to keep [freedmen] from 
overburdening the towns and depleting the agricultural regions of labor. The 
civil authorities also should be fully empowered to protect the community 
from this new imposition. The magistrates and municipal officers 
everywhere should be permitted to hold a rod in terrorem over these 
wandering, idle, creatures. Nothing short of the most efficient police system 
will prevent strolling, vagrancy, theft, and the utter destruction of our 
industrial system.”275  
 Police enforced these laws by using violence and by failing to interfere when white 
citizens used violence against African Americans. Images of blacks as unusually violent and 
prone to crime legitimized arrests and punishment for relatively minor offenses as 
preventive measures to exercise control over the black population.  
 The emergence of professional police in the North was the product of several 
factors, but many scholars suggest that it was a response less to actual criminal trends than 
to perceptions of rising social disorder. In this sense, it reflected more of an emphasis on 
social control rather than crime control.276 Those who needed to be controlled were 
regarded as members of the “dangerous classes,” who consisted mainly of “the poor, 
foreign immigrants, and free blacks.”277 This led to preventive activities to surveil such 
people, prominently inserting the police into their everyday lives. The scope of such 
measures is expressed in an 1885 article explaining the need for “Confinement of Habitual 
Drunkards,” and “Police control of Vagrants and Beggars.”278 
 In addition, as racial discrimination resulted in increasingly segregated residential 
patterns, police served to reinforce these spatial boundaries.279 This included treating 
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blacks in predominately white neighborhoods as objects of suspicion and potential 
harassment for venturing beyond their appropriate “place.”280 As Bass observes, “The 
inability to live beyond the boundaries of the ghettos and to move freely within the city 
without fear of police harassment severely restricted the civil liberties of African-
Americans.”281 
In these ways,  
The fact that the legal order not only countenanced but sustained slavery, 
segregation, and discrimination for most of our nation's history and the fact that the 
police were bound to uphold that order set a pattern for police behavior and 
attitudes toward minority communities that has persisted until the present day.282 
Aside from their physical impacts, material and cultural militarization therefore have 
powerful symbolic significance by signaling that racial and ethnic minorities, and especially 
African Americans, are “objects of law enforcement and social control rather than … 
citizens entitled to civil protections.”283 
CONCLUSION 
Police militarization has become a prominent subject of debate in recent years. 
SWAT team no-knock raids and police deployed with military equipment are naturally 
targets of criticism because they can increase the risk of violence against citizens. A deeper 
concern, however, is that they impose barriers between the police and the communities 
they serve that reflects the cultural dimension of militarization.  
 
The thousands of local police departments across the country necessarily vary with 
respect to the dimensions of militarization I have described. Nonetheless, larger trends 
suggest that it may be important for communities to rethink which measures will best 
provide public safety. As a practical matter, research indicates that the use of military 
weapons, gear, and tactics does not serve to make the public safer. On a more fundamental 
level, the use of measures designed to protect citizens from external threats posed by 
enemies of the nation are not appropriate in protecting against internal threats to public 
order. In particular, increasing police militarization risks transforming law enforcement in 
minority communities into national security operations, with corresponding greater 
authority to use force and restrict liberty. Aside from the concrete harms that this can 
inflict, it extends the national security paradigm into a domestic setting in which it should 
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not apply. In this respect, police militarization threatens the integrity of the very concept of 
national security.  
 
 Sir Robert Peel, regarded as the founder of the modern professional police force in 
London in 1829, adopted as one of his principles the following: “The police are the public 
and the public are the police.”284 Militarization in its various dimensions undermines this 
principle. In both tangible and symbolic ways, it treats certain members of society as 
outside the social contract, people who have to be managed by external force. This is 
counter-productive for law enforcement because it neglects the important role that 
communities play in creating and sustaining social order. More importantly, by treating 
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